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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Medicaid Planning Under Mental Hygiene Law Article 81
In determining whether an institutionalized individual is
eligible for benefits, Medicaid considers the individual's assets.'
Generally, anyone with liquid assets in excess of $4,850.00 will
be ineligible for Medicaid.2 Many people with assets in excess of
this amount, however, attempt to transfer away their assets in
order to create eligibility. In response, the legislature created a
"look back" period during which all uncompensated transfers
made by the Medicaid applicant or the applicant's spouse will be
considered.3 Applicants who have made uncompensated convey-
ances during this "look back" period will be ineligible for Medi-
caid benefits for a penalty period beginning with the month in
'See N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 366 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996). Under re-
cently enacted legislation, the definition of "assets" has been expanded to include all
resources and income of an individual and of the individual's spouse. Id. §
366(5)(d)(1)(i). This includes:
[MIncome and resources of an individual and of the individual's spouse, in-
cluding income or resources to which the individual or the individual's
spouse is entitled but which are not received because of action by: the in-
dividual or the individual's spouse; a person with legal authority to act in
place of or on behalf of the individual or the individual's spouse; a person
acting at the direction or upon the request of the individual or the individ-
ual's spouse; or by a court or administrative body with legal authority to
act in place of or on behalf of the individual or the individual's spouse or at
the direction or upon the request of the individual or the individual's
spouse.
Id.
'See generally N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 366 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996)
(raising level of amount of liquid assets from $4,700.00 to $4,850.00).
3 There is a 36-month "look back" period that begins "immediately preceding the
date that an institutionalized individual is both institutionalized and has applied for
medical assistance," except in the case of payments made from a trust, for which
there is a 60-month "look back" period. N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 366(5)(d)(1)(vi)
(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996); see Peter J. Strauss, New York's New Medicaid
Statute, N.Y. L.J.', June 29, 1994, at 3 (discussing implications of "look back" peri-
ods).
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which the transfer occurred.4 Certain transfers, however, are
exempt and do not trigger a penalty period. Exempt transfers
include, in some circumstances, the transfer of a home.5
4 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(d)(4) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996). In de-
termining the penalty period, the cumulative value of uncompensated transfers is
divided by the average monthly cost of maintaining someone in a nursing home. Id;
see also Peter J. Strauss, Medicaid Revisions in 1993 Budget Act, N.Y. L.J.', Sept.
30, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Medicaid Revisions]. The monthly cost in New York in
1993 was $5,584.00. See Strauss, supra note 3, at 3. "Roughly speaking, in the New
York metropolitan area the donor is ineligible for a month of Medicaid coverage for
every $6,000.[00] given away." Daniel G. Fish & Todd A. Krichmar, Estate and
Medicaid Planning by Article 81 Guardians, N.Y. L.J.', Dec. 16, 1994, at 1. In addi-
tion, the durational maximum or a "cap" on the penalty period no longer exists. See
Strauss, supra note 3, at 3.
Although Congress has permitted the states to extend the transfer penalty to
home care, see 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(C)(ii) (1994), New York has not adopted this
option. Section 80 of the Governor's Program Bill on Medicaid Cost Containment,
N.Y.S. 1805, N.Y.A. 3105, 218th Sess., would adopt this option and create a "look-
back" and penalty period for long term care services for non-institutionalized indi-
viduals. See generally Peter J. Strauss, Proposals and Interpretations that Threaten
Medicaid Access, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 31, 1995, at 3 [hereinafter Proposals and Interpre-
tations] (criticizing "never-ending attempt to reduce access to Medicaid through
legislative changes").
Because of the expanded definition of "assets," see supra note 1, disclaimers un-
der N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11 would be included in the transfer of
assets rules and would cause the disclaiming party to incur a penalty period of in-
eligibility. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11(c) (McKinney 1991 &
Supp. 1996). The transfer of assets rules also apply to any action taken by an owner
or any other person that reduces or eliminates the applicant's interest in property
which the applicant owns in common with another in joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, or similar arrangements. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(d)(5) (McKinney
1992 & Supp. 1996). Thus, a withdrawal from a bank account held by the applicant
and the applicant's spouse as joint tenants would result in a penalty period.
In addition to a period of ineligibility, a transfer within the "look-back" period
may result in criminal liability. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996, signed into law on August 21, 1996 and effective January 1, 1997, sig-
nificantly curtails asset transfers aimed at qualifring for Medicaid covered nursing
home care. The statute makes certain transfers a federal crime. The statute pro-
vides, in relevant part:
Whoever ... (6) knowingly and willfully disposes of assets (including by any
transfer in trust) in order for an individual to become eligible for medical
assistance under a State plan under Title XIX, if disposing of the assets re-
sults in the imposition of a period of ineligibility for such assistance under
section 1917(c), shall i) in the case of such a statement, representation,
concealment, failure or conversion ... be guilty of a felony ... or ... shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(a)(6) (1996).
" See N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 366(5)(d)(3)(i) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996). The
exemption applies to a home transferred to:
(A) the spouse of the individual; (B) a child of the individual who is under
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Individuals who fail to qualify for Medicaid have to bear the
high cost of institutionalized medical care personally and, thus,
could quickly exhaust their life savings. Accordingly, those who
foresee the possible need for institutionalized care engage in
"Medicaid planning."'
Medicaid planning involves the transferring of assets and
has two purposes. First, it enables individuals to become eligible
for Medicaid benefits, which will subsidize the cost of nursing
home care. Second, this type of planning assists in the preser-
vation of some assets for a person's spouse or heirs.7 For compe-
tent adults, Medicaid planning generally does not create prob-
lems. These adults are permitted to give away as much of their
property as they wish, to whomever they wish, and become eli-
gible for benefits subject to any penalty period incurred.' Com-
the age of twenty-one years or blind or disabled; (C) a sibling of the indi-
vidual who has an equity interest in such home and who resided in such
home for a period of at least one year immediately before the date the in-
dividual became an institutionalized individual; or (4) a child of the indi-
vidual who was residing in such home for a period of at least two years
immediately before the date the individual became an institutionalized in-
dividual, and who provided care to the individual which permitted the in-
dividual to reside at home rather than in an institution or facility....
Id.
Other exempt transfers include transfers to a spouse or to another for the sole
benefit of the spouse, transfers from the spouse to another for the sole benefit of the
spouse, transfers to a blind or disabled child or to a trust established solely for the
benefit of such child, and transfers to trusts solely for the benefit of a disabled indi-
vidual under the age of sixty-five. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(d)(3)(ii) (McKinney
1992 & Supp. 1996).
Also exempted are transfers made for purposes other than qualifying for medi-
cal assistance and transfers made in exchange for fair market value. Id. §
366(5)(d)(3)(iii)(A), (B). If property is transferred for less than fair market value and
is returned, the transfer will not result in a penalty. Id. § 366 (5)(d)(3)(iii)(c). An
additional exception is recognized where denial of assistance would result in undue
hardship. Id. § 366(5)(d)(3)(iv).
6 See Proposals and Interpretations, supra note 4, at 3 ("Medicaid has, in fact,
become the source of relief from impoverishment for many middle income persons
and families ....").
7 See In re Baird, 167 Misc. 2d 526, 634 N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1995); In re Heller, N.Y. L.J., July 28, 1995, at 24, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County); In re Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 32, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County); In re Beller, N.Y .L.J., Aug. 31, 1994, at 23, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County); In re Goldberg, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 1994, at 24, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County); In re Klapper, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1994, at 26, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County).
' A gift tax may be incurred as a result of such transfers. See I.R.C. § 2511
(1994). But see I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1994) (providing annual exclusion of $10,000.00 per
donee); I.R.C. § 2010 (1994) (authorizing unified credit for every taxpayer to transfer
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plications in Medicaid planning, however, arise when an individ-
ual becomes institutionalized and incapacitated but did not fore-
see the need for, was unaware of, or simply did not have the op-
portunity to engage in any preparation. As a result, the
incapacitated person's loved ones are often left with the dilemma
of providing for the necessary medical treatment and concur-
rently protecting the incompetent's assets.
In a recent series of decisions, New York courts have
granted judicial approval for guardian's to engage in Medicaid
planning for people who are incapacitated! Under Article 81 of
New York's Mental Hygiene Law, courts have granted permis-
sion to guardians0 to transfer their wards' assets so that the
wards may qualify for Medicaid. Although these cases represent
the first instances of Medicaid planning by guardians of incom-
petents, similar relief has traditionally been granted for estate
planning purposes under the common law doctrine of substituted
judgment."1 Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law has now spe-
of $600,000.00 gift tax free for entire life).
9 See In re DaRonco, 167 Misc. 2d 140, 145, 638 N.Y.S.2d 275, 278 (Sup. Ct.
Westchester County 1995) (permitting transfer of assets from incapacitated hus-
band to wife for purpose of obtaining Medicaid eligibility); see also In re Baird, 167
Misc. 2d 526, 530, 634 N.Y.S.2d 971, 973 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1995) (stating
public policy should authorize gifts or renunciation of inheritances where alternate
recipient is dependent of incapacitated person); In re Daniels, 162 Misc. 2d 840, 842,
618 N.Y.S.2d 499, 501 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1994) (finding transfer of assets for
purpose of Medicaid planning not violative of public policy).
10 See generally N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81 (McKinney Supp. 1996).
1 The doctrine of "substituted judgment" was established in England by Lord
Eldon in the case of Ex parte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816). In determining
whether to grant needy relatives part of the surplus income of an incompetent, the
court substituted its judgment for that of the "lunatic," and considered what the in-
competent "would probably do." Id. at 879. The court then did for the incompetent's
benefit what would be "wise and prudent." Id. This test was a combination of sub-
jective and objective factors.
New York was the first state to adopt the substituted judgment doctrine in In re
Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. 257 (N.Y. Ch. 1844). The Court of Chancery permitted
payments out of surplus income to provide for the incompetent's dependents be-
cause it was supposed that was how "he would act were he of sound mind." Id. at
259. Thus, New York adopted a subjective standard. See In re Flagler, 248 N.Y. 415,
418-19, 162 N.E. 471, 472 (1928) (stating court may only give weight to moral and
charitable considerations as would incompetent person himself); In re Lord, 227
N.Y. 145, 149, 124 N.E. 727, 728 (N.Y. 1919) (denying payment to incompetent's at-
torney because there was no evidence that incompetent would have been under duty
to do so if restored to health).
In subsequent cases the courts departed from the strictly subjective standard.
See In re Daly, 142 Misc. 2d 85, 87, 536 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County
1988). Applications to transfer assets and make gifts of an incompetent's assets be-
came important in estate planning to preserve assets from estate taxes. An objective
[Vol.70:823
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cifically codified this doctrine of substituted judgment where the
court substitutes its judgment for that of the incapacitated per-S~l12
son. 1
New York's first application of the new statutory substi-
tuted judgment doctrine was in the form of estate planning. In
In re Scheiber,"3 the court permitted Article 81 co-guardians to
renounce an inheritance due to their ward/mother and permitted
them to transfer so much of their ward's assets as would permit
the estate to pass down without incurring any federal estate
tax.'
4
standard was adopted by many courts in tax planning cases. See In re Florence, 140
Misc. 2d 393, 530 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1988) (stating authoriza-
tion to make gifts will be granted where ward would act as reasonable, prudent per-
son); In re Myles, 57 Misc. 2d 101, 291 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1968); In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County
1962). Courts emphasized a subjective standard, however, when dealing with gifts of
the incompetent's property. See In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288
(Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1962); In re Fleming, 173 Misc. 851, 852, 19 N.Y.S.2d 234,
236 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1940) (noting primary consideration was if incompetent
would have made payment if sane).
The required proof that the incompetent would have made the gift began with a
proof "beyond all reasonable doubt" standard. In re Heeney, 2 Barb. Ch. 326, 328
(N.Y. Ch. 1847); see also In re Kernochan, 84 Misc. 565, 567, 146 N.Y.S. 1026, 1028
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1914). Subsequently, the burden of proof was reduced to a
clear and convincing standard for gifts of principal, Fleming, 173 Misc. at 854, 19
N.Y.S.2d at 237, and further reduced to a preponderance standard for gifts of sur-
plus income, Flagler, 248 N.Y. at 419, 162 N.E. at 472, and gifts for estate tax bene-
fits, Florence, 140 Misc. 2d at 394-95, 530 N.Y.S.2d at 982. For additional history
and comments on the substituted judgment doctrine, see Joyce A. Edelman, The De-
velopment of the "Substituted Judgement" Rule and Its Application in New York as a
Vehicle for Estate Planning for Incompetents, 33 ALB. L. REV. 597 (1969). See also
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980 et seq. (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996) (permitting
agents appointed by health care proxy to make health care decisions on behalf of
incapacitated persons upon clear and convincing standard that directions are in ac-
cordance with wishes of said person).
" Fis section gives statutory recognition to the common law doctrine of sub-
stituted judgment recognized by the courts of this state and other jurisdictions."
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21, Law Revision Commission Comments at 376
(McKinney 1996).
"In re Scheiber, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 38, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County).
'4 See I.R.C. § 2010 (1994) (unified credit permits transfer of up to $600,000.00
free of estate tax). The court permitted the renunciation and transfer to co-
guardians pursuant to N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11(c). In the exercise
of "cautious prudence," however, the court only authorized the transfer of assets in
excess of $600,000 because the co-guardians did not include what steps, if any, were
taken to determine whether their ward had an existing will. Scheiber, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 18, 1993, at 38, col. 5; see also Carson, 39 Misc. 2d at 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d at 289
(transferring of assets was initially permitted outright but later partially reversed
based on provision in subsequently obtained will which required daughter's share to
1996]
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In In re Driscoll,5 the guardian requested permission to
renounce a substantial inheritance due to his ward/wife and re-
ceive it in his own name. 6 The Department of Social Services
objected based on the fact that the transfer to the guard-
ian/husband would have rendered the ward/wife (who lived in a
nursing home) ineligible for Medicaid. 7 The court, in determin-
ing whether to grant the guardian permission to renounce the
funds, noted that inter-spousal transfers do not render an insti-
tutionalized spouse ineligible for benefits. 8 Furthermore, the
court found that the ward, if competent, could have disclaimed
the property or could have accepted the property and then trans-
ferred it to her husband without incurring a penalty.9 The court
noted in dicta that the guardian had the authority to make a
transfer of the property had it been previously accepted by the
ward.0 For these reasons, the court granted permission to the
guardian to renounce the ward's inheritance and receive it in his
21
own name.
In In re Klapper,2" the guardian/son petitioned the court for
permission to transfer virtually all of his mother's assets to him
and his family.3 Kapper had possessed assets in excess of
$300,000, thus rendering her ineligible for Medicaid.24  The
guardian/son wished to transfer these assets solely to qualify her
remain in trust).
'5 In re Driscoll, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1993, at 30, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau
County).
16 Id. Although not explicitly stated in the opinion, this renunciation was likely
sought to prevent these funds from being used to pay for the ward's nursing home
care.
17 Id.
"' Id. (citing N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(c)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
1996)).
19 Id.
20 Driscoll, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1993, at 30, col. 4.
21 Id.
' In re Mapper, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1994, at 26, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County).
Id. Fruma Mapper's income consisted of Social Security income in the amount
of $645.00 per month, German Holocaust reparation payments of approximately
$400.00 per month, and an I.L.G.W.U. pension of $112.50 per month. Id. Her assets
consisted of two certificates of deposit, a passbook account, mutual funds, and five
annuities. She also owned jointly with her son 144 shares of stock valued at ap-
proximately $45,000.00 allocated to the cooperative apartment in which she lived
prior to her placement in a nursing home. Id. Finally, she owned a Dreyfus New
York Tax Exempt Bond Fund jointly with her son that was valued at approximately
$250.00. Id.
'4See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996).
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for Medicaid.'
The threshold issue in In re Klapper was whether a court
could authorize a guardian to transfer part of the incapacitated
person's assets in order for the incapacitated person to become
eligible for Medicaid or whether the guardian would have to
"spend down" the assets in order to meet the eligibility require-
ments." The court looked to the powers that were granted to a
guardian under the Mental Hygiene Law. These powers in-
cluded the authority to make gifts, 7 to release contingent and
expectant interests in property,' and to renounce or disclaim any
interest in property. 9 Based upon these powers and the deci-
sions in Scheiber and Driscoll, the court concluded that a
guardian was not required to "spend down" the ward's assets."0
The court further evaluated the public policy considerations
in permitting such a transfer."' The underlying intent of Article
81 was to assist incapacitated persons and to compensate for
their limitations.32 The court further noted that a rejection of the
application for this transfer would deny the incapacitated person
the opportunity to preserve her assets from being depleted by
medical expenses when the same opportunity would be available
to all competent persons. The court then concluded that such a
denial would be in "direct contravention of the expressed inten-
tion of Article 81.""S
After concluding that Medicaid planning was a "proper ob-
jective" for a guardian, the Klapper court then evaluated the ap-
propriateness of the suggested transfer by looking at three re-
quirements.' First, the court must find that the incapacitated
person either lacked mental capacity and was not likely to regain
- Kapper, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1994, at 26, col. 1.
26 Id.
2 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
Id. § 81.21(a)(3).
2Id. § 81.21(a)(10); see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11
(McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1996) (requiring renunciation of property to be in writing,
signed and acknowledged, filed with clerk of court within nine months of disposi-
tion, and court approval for renunciations made on behalf of infant, incompetent,
conservatee or decedent).
"In re Kapper, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1994, at 26, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County).
31 Id.
32 Id.
3Id.
4Id.
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it in the foreseeable future to make the transfer personally or
possessed the requisite capacity and actually consented to the
transfer.35 Secondly, the court must find that a competent per-
son would be likely to make the transfer.36 Lastly, before inca-
pacitation, the incompetent person must not have manifested an
intention inconsistent with the transfer." The court must be
satisfied by clear and convincing evidence that the latter two re-
quirements were met."
The Klapper court further considered the statutory factors
set forth in Mental Hygiene Law section 81.21."9 The court noted
that the proposed transferee, Kiapper's son, was presumptively
the sole distributee and that her most recently executed will left
her entire estate to him. Significantly, most of the assets were
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(e)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
3c Id. § 81.21(e)(2).
37 Id. § 81.21(e)(3).
Id. § 81.21(e). The statute adopted an objective test, i.e., whether the reason-
able person would make the transfer, with a subjective element, i.e., whether there
is clear and convincing evidence that this incapacitated person would not make the
transfer to this proposed transferee. This standard is much less burdensome to meet
than the common law subjective standard, i.e., whether this incapacitated person
would, beyond a reasonable doubt, make the proposed gift to this transferee. See su-
pra note 11 (discussing various standards).
3 In re Kapper, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1994, at 26, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County). New York Mental Hygiene Law § 81.21(d) provides:
In determining whether to approve the application, the court shall con-
sider:
1. whether the incapacitated person has sufficient capacity to make
the proposed disposition himself or herself, and, if so, whether he or
she has consented to the proposed disposition;
2. whether the disability of the incapacitated person is likely to be of
sufficiently short duration such that he or she should make the de-
termination with respect to the proposed disposition when no longer
disabled;
3. whether the needs of the incapacitated person and his or her de-
pendents or other persons depending upon the incapacitated person
for support can be met from the remainder of the assets of the inca-
pacitated person after the transfer is made;
4. whether the donees or beneficiaries of the proposed disposition are
the natural objects of the bounty of the incapacitated person and
whether the proposed disposition is consistent with any known testa-
mentary plan or pattern of gifts he or she has made;
5. whether the proposed disposition will produce estate, gift, income or
other tax savings which will significantly benefit the incapacitated
person or his or her dependents or other persons for whom the inca-
pacitated person would be concerned; and
6. such other factors as the court deems relevant.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(d) (McKinney Supp. 1996).
830 [Vol.70:823
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either held jointly with her son, in trust for him, or named him
beneficiary. Furthermore, prior to her incapacitation, Mapper
provided her son's family with regular monthly support. The
court ultimately concluded that the transfer would be appropri-
ate. °
A similar type of relief was requested in In re Belier.4"
Dorothea Beller-Maltzman was a nursing home resident who
suffered from degenerative dementia.42 Her guardian/son peti-
tioned the court to permit him to convey most of her assets to
himself and her grandchildren from her predeceased child so
that she could qualify for Medicaid without having to "spend
down" her assets.43 Even though there was no history of inter vi-
vos gifting, the court observed that upon her death all of her as-
sets would pass to the petitioner and the other proposed trans-
ferees, all of whom were the natural objects of her bounty and
her presumptive distributees." The court further considered
that the ward would be benefited by reduced estate taxes and
would receive Medicaid upon qualifying.45 Thus, once again the
court concluded that the transfer was appropriate.46
Decided the same day and by the same court as Beller was
In re Goldberg." Shirley Ginsberg was an eighty-eight year old
woman who was suffering from aggressive senile dementia and
residing in a nursing home.48 Jean Goldberg, Ginsberg's guard-
ian/daughter, sought permission to transfer her mother's assets
to herself and to the children of the ward's other predeceased
daughter.49 Although in this case the ward did not have a will
4Kapper, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1994, at 26, col. 1.
4' In re Beller, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 31, 1994, at 23, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County).4id.
Id. Dorothea Beller-Maltzman's monthly income consisted of $590.00 in Social
Security and approximately $670.00 in interest and dividend payments. Id. Her as-
sets consisted of stocks and bank accounts totalling approximately $164,476.47. Id.
"Beller, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 31, 1994 at 23, col. 4 (noting that incompetent's inten-
tion to benefit her family could be determined from arrangements she had made for
disposition of her assets after her death).
4Id.
"' Id. The court, in considering whether the disposition was consistent with the
ward's testamentary plan, also noted that the petitioner had lived with her for the
past eight years. Id.
47 In re Goldberg, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 29, 1994, at 24, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County).
48 Id.
"Id. Shirley Ginsberg's monthly income consisted of Social Security in the
1996]
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and there was no history of gift-giving by her, the court permit-
ted the transfer. The court noted that the proposed transferees
were her presumptive distributees and that most of her assets
were held in Totten trust accounts with the proposed transferees
as beneficiaries."
In In re Daniels,"l the guardian sought a renunciation of an
inheritance due to her "profoundly disabled" ward and sought to
transfer bank assets to both of the ward's two children and the
ward's house to his daughter.52 Significantly, the ward's will left
the ward's house to his son and daughter equally, rather than
solely to the ward's daughter as the guardian had requested."3
This discrepancy, however, was not sufficient to suggest to the
court that the ward had manifested a prior contrary intent to the
proposed disposition.54 The court permitted the transfer even
though it was "not wholly consistent with the testamentary
plan"55 because a competent, reasonable individual "would prefer
that his property pass to his child rather than serve as a source
of payment for Medicaid and nursing home care bills where a
choice is available."5"
In In re Parnes,57 the guardian sought to transfer nearly all
amount of $746.00 and approximately $57.33 in dividends. Id. Her assets, which
consisted of shares in a cooperative apartment, stocks and bonds, a checking ac-
count, and five savings accounts, totaled approximately $95,066.89. Id.
so Goldberg, . , Aug. 29, 1994, at 24 col. 1. The court was apparently satisfied
with the petitioner's testimony that she had personal knowledge that her mother
had not prepared a will and expected her other property to pass by intestate suc-
cession. Id. It is submitted that Medicaid planning will become more difficult and
may require the appointment of a guardian ad litem in situations involving cross-
petitions for guardianship between rival siblings, lost or revoked wills, charges of
fraud or undue influence, etc. It is submitted that the court in these situations may
need to engage in a mini-probate trial within the context of a petition to distribute
assets for Medicaid planning.
51 162 Misc. 2d 840, 618 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1994).
52 Id. at 842, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 500. The ward had over $480,000.00 of assets in-
cluding the inheritance, the realty, and some bank accounts. In re Daniels, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 7, 1994, at 34, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County). The transfer of the house
to the ward's daughter would have no effect on Medicaid eligibility because she was
under the age of twenty-one at the time of the transfer. Daniels, 162 Misc. 2d at
846, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 502; see N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(d)(3)(i)(B) (McKinney
1992 & Supp. 1996).
Daniels, 162 Misc. 2d at 841, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 502.
' Id. at 847-48, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
5' Id. at 848, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 503.
56 id.
"7 In re Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 3,2 col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
County), reargument granted, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 32, col. 2, motion to vacate
denied, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 7, 1995, at 33, col. 5.
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of Ruth Parnes' assets to her husband. 8 An initial petition was
unsuccessful because Medicaid considers the assets of both
spouses in determining eligibility59 and, thus, the inter-spousal
transfer would have had no impact." The guardian brought a
motion to reargue61 based upon the execution by the ward's hus-
band of a spousal refusal62 wherein he refused to use any of his
" Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32 ,col. 2. Ruth Parnes' monthly income
consisted of $464.00 in Social Security and $600.00 in interest payments. Id. She
owned a one-half interest in the stock to the cooperative apartment in which she
lived with her husband prior to her placement in a nursing home. Id. Her assets
consisted of $75,000.00 in bank accounts and $75,000.00 in securities. Id. Approxi-
mately $200,000.00 of her assets had been transferred to her husband prior to her
placement in the nursing home. Id.
'9 The New York Social Services Law provides, in pertinent part:
[Un determining the resources of the institutionalized spouse and the
community spouse in establishing eligibility for medical assistance:
(a) All resources ... held by either the institutionalized spouse or the
community spouse or both shall be considered available to the institu-
tionalized spouse to the extent that the value of the resources exceeds
the community spouse resource allowance.
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 366-c(5)(a) (McKinney 1992); see also [1996] 18 N.Y.C.R.R. §
360-4.10(c)(2). At the time of the hearing, Walter Parnes had assets of approxi-
mately $345,000.00. See Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 32, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Kings County).
Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32, col..
6 Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 12, 1994, at 32, col. 2.
The right of spousal refusal is codified in the Federal Medicaid statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(3) (1993), and in New York Social Services Law § 366(3)(a).
Section 366-c(5)(b) provides:
An institutionalized spouse shall not be ineligible for medical assistance by
reason of excess resources determined under paragraph (a) of this subdivi-
sion, if the institutionalized spouse executes an assignment of support from
the community spouse in favor of the social services district and depart-
ment, or the institutionalized spouse is unable to execute such assignment
due to physical or mental impairment, or to deny assistance would create
an undue hardship, as defined by the commissioner.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366-c(5)(b) (McKinney 1992).
Medical assistance shall be furnished to applicants in cases where, al-
though such applicant has a responsible relative with sufficient income and
resources to provide medical assistance as determined by the regulations of
the department, the income and resources of the responsible relative are
not available to such applicant because of the absence of such relative or
the refusal or failure of such relative to provide the necessary care and as-
sistance. In such cases, however, the furnishing of such assistance shall
create an implied contract with such relative, and the cost thereof may be
recovered from such relative in accordance with title six of article three
and other applicable provisions of law.
N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAw § 366(3)(a) (McKinney 1992). Sections 78 and 79 of the Gover-
nor's Bill on Medicaid Cost Containment, N.Y.S. 1805, N.Y.A. 3105, 218th Sess.
(1995), call for changes in Social Services Law § 366(2)(b) and (3)(a) which would
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resources to pay for his wife's nursing home expenses." The
court noted that the ward's husband was her presumptive dis-
tributee,64 that her most recently executed will left everything to
him, and that the ward would receive significant tax benefits.6 5
Furthermore, with no support from her husband, the transfer
would immediately render the ward eligible for Medicaid because
there is no look back penalty period for transfers made between
spouses.66 On reargument, the court granted the application to
eliminate the right of spousal refusal in situations where the applicant is not insti-
tutionalized. Section 79 would further authorize recovery of Medicaid costs from the
spouse or the spouse's estate, thus reversing In re Craig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 391-92, 624
N.E.2d 1003, 1005, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 910 (1993)(holding no implied contract exists
to repay Department of Social Services out of estate of surviving spouse for medical
assistance payments made on behalf of sick spouse where surviving spouse lacked
sufficient means contemporaneously with provision of medical assistance to prede-
ceased spouse); see also N.Y.S. 1805, 218th Sess. § 79 (1995). Section 93 of the bill
would redefine 'estate" to include an interest at the time of death, including an in-
terest in a joint tenancy, a tenancy-in-common, a trust or a right or cause of action.
N.Y.S. 1805, 218th Sess. § 93 (1995). The bill would also allow the Department of
Social Services to sell or assign for collection its Medicaid liens and recovery actions.
N.Y.S. 1805, 218th Sess. § 94 (1995). Currently, Medicaid recovery from estates is
mandatory in New York and the estate is defined as "all real and personal property
and other assets included within the individual's estate and passing under the
terms of a valid will or by intestacy." N.Y. SOC. SERv. LAW § 69(6) (McKinney 1992
& Supp. 1996). Federal law also permits a state to recover medical assistance from
nonprobate assets. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (1994). See generally Proposals and In-
terpretations, supra note 4, at 3 (noting that "[iun his 1995 Budget bill Governor
Pataki has proposed draconian cuts and changes in the Medicaid program.").
' Walter Parnes also asserted that he would continue to exercise his right of
spousal refusal following the transfer of his wife's assets to him. In re Parnes, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 32, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County). Where a Medicaid ap-
plicant's spouse has exercised his or her right of spousal refusal, the Government
has the option of suing the community spouse for support. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(3)
(1994); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 366-c(5)(a), 366-c(5)(b) (McKinney 1992 & Supp.
1996). The court noted that support proceedings are rarely instituted by the gov-
ernment against the community spouse. Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 32, n.3
col. 2.
"Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 32, n.3 col. 2. Her daughters would also be
distributees but as co-petitioners herein they consented to the proposed disposition.
Id.; see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1(a)(1) (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1996).
65 Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 32, col. 2. The spouse's estate would be in-
creased by the transfer, thereby risking the potential for incurring estate taxes un-
less the spouse engaged in proper estate planning.
66 Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 32, col. 2; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i);
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 366(5)(d)(3)(ii)(A) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996) (indicating
that there is no penalty period for inter-spousal transfers); see also In re Driscoll,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1993, at 30, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nassau County) (noting in dicta
that Article 81 guardian is authorized to transfer ward's assets to ward's spouse).
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transfer assets."7
It is submitted that the Medicaid and estate planning per-
mitted by these decisions was appropriate, and even encouraged,
under the Mental Hygiene Law. Concededly, by empowering
guardians with the ability to engage in Medicaid planning, the
result may seem incomprehensible in that an individual is able
to pass on the family fortune while at the same time receive
public assistance. As Justice Rossetti stated in In re Driscoll,
however, "[T]he new Mental Hygiene Law under which we are
operating gives us no authority to consider such adverse conse-
quences to the public fisc."69 Importantly, when individuals
transfer substantial assets, they may be required to pay a gift
tax.70 Furthermore, since there is no longer a cap on the penalty
period, persons making such transfers will be subject to a longer
period of ineligibility during which they will incur the cost of
their own nursing home care.7
In reality, those who engage in and benefit from Medicaid
planning are not millionaires but, rather, middle income per-
sons.72 Thus, the extraordinary costs of financing long-term care
forces them to look to Medicaid as the "payor of last resort."73 It
is submitted that when these individuals transfer assets, there is
a benefit to society in that the ward will thereby help to prevent
his dependents from requiring public assistance.
"' Parnes, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 2, 1994, at 32, col. 2. The Department of Social Serv-
ices moved to vacate the decision that had allowed the transfer, but the court found
that its arguments were without merit and denied the motion. In re Parnes, N.Y.
L.J.t Apr. 7, 1995, at 33, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County).
' In In re Daniels, Justice Luciano observed:
While one may choose to debate whether the authority of one to engage in
Medicaid planning is sound public social or fiscal policy, less open to debate
is the conclusion that the codified rules and policies to which [Justice Le-
one] referred in Matter of Kapper ... authorize, if not encourage, such
Medicaid planning.
In re Daniels, 162 Misc. 2d 840, 843, 618 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1994).
Driscoll, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1993, at 30, col. 4.
70 See supra note 8.
7, Indeed, a transfer of 1 million dollars will result in a penalty period of 179
months ($1,000,000.00 divided by $5,584.00 equals 179). See Medicaid Revisions,
supra note 4, at 3 (suggesting that applicants who make substantial transfers
should apply for Medicaid after "look back" period expires because of unlimited
penalty period).
7 2 See Proposals and Interpretations, supra note 4, at 3.
"' Id.; see also Peter J. Strauss, Long-Term Care and Pending Medicaid
Changes, N.Y. L.J., July 30, 1993, at 3.
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In the realm of Medicaid planning by guardians of incompe-
tents, court supervision is necessary and has been provided. For
example, only those who have already been found suitable by a
court to be the guardian of the property of a ward may make
these applications.74 Safeguards such as these are incorporated
in the statute to protect the assets of the ward from a guardian's
self-dealing,75 to ensure that the ward has enough assets to pay
for necessary nursing care during the period of ineligibility,"6 and
to ensure that assets are not being passed down to persons who
the ward preferred not to receive his estate.77 Additionally, the
courts have refused to permit transfers which would not assist
the ward to become Medicaid eligible.7"
74 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.19(a)(1) & (d) (McKinney Supp. 1996); In re
Roy, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 31, 1994, at 34, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk County) (denying
application of incapacitated person's cousin to be sole property guardian because
cousin had assumed that, in exchange for necessities provided to ward, he was enti-
tled to, and thus had appropriated, substantial amount of incapacitated person's
assets); see also In re Wingate, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1995, at 33, col. 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County) (denying petition of forty-year friend of incapacitated woman to be
appointed guardian because of questionable transfers made to herself under statu-
tory power of attorney). But see In re Scheiber, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 38, col. 5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk County) (appointing daughter of incapacitated woman co-
guardian of her mother despite concern of court evaluator who found daughter im-
properly secured power of attorney from incompetent mother and transferred
mother's assets to herself based upon such authority). See generally Margaret Ann
Bomba, Summary Discovery, Turnover Proceedings Under Article 81 of the Mental
Hygiene Law, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 1994, at 1 (discussing "virtual epidemic of financial
victimization of the elderly" which often takes form of stripping elderly person of
assets for ostensible purpose of attaining Medicaid eligibility).
71 See Wingate, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 17, 1995, at 33, col. 3; Roy, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 31,
1994, at 34, col. 3 (denying petitioner's request to be appointed guardian).
7' The amount to be transferred is calculated to provide for the needs, mainte-
nance, support, and well-being of the incapacitated person during the penalty pe-
riod. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(b)(2) & (d)(3) (McKinney 1996); In re Bel-
ler, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 31, 1994, at 23, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County). The courts
have also required that the debts of the ward be paid.
77 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.21(e)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1996) (requiring
clear and convincing evidence that transfer is not inconsistent with prior expressed
intent of ward).
78 Cases which have allowed the transfer of nearly all of the ward's assets have
required the guardian to retain $3,200.00 as a luxury fund since that amount is an
exempt resource, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(2)(a) (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1996),
and a burial fund in the amount of $1,500.00 because that amount is disregarded for
Medicaid eligibility purposes, [1996J 18 N.Y.C.R.R. § 360-4.6(b)(1)(ii). In In re Kap-
per, the court would not permit the guardian to transfer German Holocaust repara-
tion payments because they were exempt assets for determining Medicaid eligibility.
In re Kapper, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1994, at 26, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County). The
initial application in Parnes was denied because unless the husband executed a
spousal refusal, his assets would be considered and the proposed transfer would
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As Medicaid planning is a readily available opportunity to
competent persons, it must also be similarly available to the in-
capacitated. 9 Requiring incapacitated persons to "spend down"
their entire life savings before becoming eligible for Medicaid
while allowing those who are competent may denude themselves
of all their assets to become Medicaid eligible would be patently
unfair. The issue should not be whether to allow Medicaid
planning by the guardians of incompetent people, but whether to
allow Medicaid planning at all. Incapacitated people must be af-
forded the same opportunities as those not under a disability.
Neil V. Carbone
have no impact at all on the'ward's Medicaid eligibility. In re Parnes, N.Y. L.J.,
Sept. 12, 1994, at 32, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County).
7 "There is no question that Medicaid planning by competent persons is legally
permissible and that proper planning benefits their estates." Klapper, N.Y. L.J.,
Aug. 9, 1994, at 26, col. 1.
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